Andy Berkin Head of Research at Bridgeway bio image

Andrew L. Berkin, PhD

Key Points:

  • The recent spike in stock market volatility has coincided with a notable correction; such behavior is common in periods of higher turbulence but is typically followed by a bounce back.
  • Many factors hold up well in volatile times; others such as small size suffer when volatility spikes but tend to recover as the market calms down.
  • Using diversifying factors other than market beta and considering uncorrelated absolute return strategies can benefit a portfolio, both in general and during periods of volatility.

Recently, stock market volatility has increased dramatically. Investors are worried about a prospective increase in inflation[i] and analysts have raised the odds of a recession[ii]. Bond yields have gone up[iii] while stocks fell[iv]. Returns of stock indexes have had large swings from day to day and even intraday. The VIX, a measure of expected volatility, surged from 17 at the start of the year to over 50 in early April, a level only seen with the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and the Great Financial Crisis of 2008. This spike in volatility has many investors wondering what to expect. In this piece, I examine what high volatility has meant historically for the stock market as a whole and for various market segments.

Historical Volatility

Exhibit 1 shows realized volatility in the U.S. stock market back to July 1963, when data on some of the factors examined later in this piece first become available. I do not use the VIX as it has a shorter history, but results for the common period are qualitatively similar. Volatility here is measured at a monthly level, using the standard deviation of daily returns for the total market. Data through 2024 comes from the Ken French data library[v]; for 2025 I use returns of the Russell 3000 which is a close proxy.

Exhibit 1: Monthly volatility of U.S. stocks, July 1963 – April 2025.

Stock Markey Volatility by Month (%)

The current spike in market volatility to 3.13% is the fourth highest since 1963. For comparison, the average over this period is 0.87% and the median is 0.72%. The three higher episodes correspond to the Black Monday crash in October 1987, the Great Financial Crisis in 2008, and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020. Some other observational facts stand out. Spikes in volatility can be sudden and sharp but tend to quickly revert to more typical levels. But volatility also tends to be persistent, with elevated levels around those spikes as well as in the Tech Bubble of the late 1990s, while we see other long periods of calmer markets. This pattern is borne out statistically, as the correlation of volatility from one month to the next is 64%. In contrast, the correlation of market returns from one month to the next is only about 3.5%. So if history is any guide, we may expect volatility to come down from its current peak but remain high.

Volatility and Stock Returns

The volatility we are currently experiencing has been accompanied by an overall market downturn. Major indices in the U.S. all suffered corrections and now sit well off their highs. The three other volatility peaks seen in Exhibit 1 all corresponded with bear markets. But we also know that stocks ultimately rebounded, in some cases quite swiftly such as during COVID-19 pandemic times. To gain a better understanding of how general these results are, I examine historical market returns in different volatility regimes.

For this analysis, I categorize all months from July 1963 through December 2024 into one of five buckets, depending on the market volatility that month relative to the full set of months. I will explain how to interpret these exhibits, but readers who do not get enjoyment from tables of numbers can ignore them and simply focus on the explanation in the paragraphs below.

In Exhibit 2 below, the first column of numbers is for the full period, a total of 738 months, or over 60 years. We see the well-known result that stocks have done very well historically, averaging 0.95% monthly returns. These returns have come with some volatility. The monthly standard deviation[vi] is 4.47%, with a minimum of -22.64% and a maximum of 16.61%. Such volatility is why equities command a risk premium, leading to the high and statistically significant (t-stat of 5.76) returns.

Exhibit 2: Monthly returns (in %) of U.S. stocks dependent on volatility, July 1963 – December 2024.

Source: Ken French data library, Bridgeway calculations

The next set of five columns gives monthly stock returns depending on volatility that month. The lowest quintile or 20% of months by volatility are on the left, the most volatile quintile is on the right, and the intermediate quintiles are in between. Average returns monotonically decrease as volatility increases: Stocks return 1.92% in the 148 months when volatility is lowest, declining to a loss of 1.05% in the 148 months when volatility is highest. The market declines we saw with the biggest spikes in volatility hold more generally when volatility is elevated. Not only is the average monthly return of -1.05% significant with a t-stat of -1.90, it is even more significant relative to the overall average market return of 0.95%.

While these results hold on average, they are by no means a guarantee, with plenty of variation in all volatility environments. Unsurprisingly, that variation is greatest when volatility is highest, with a standard deviation of 6.69% and the most extreme minimum and maximum returns. But even the calmest months provide a wide range of outcomes. Returns can be nicely positive or disappointingly negative in all volatility environments.

These results help explain current returns based on volatility, but what about future market returns? This question is addressed in the final five columns. Here I look at the volatility in a given month and show the next month’s returns. The picture is different. Most notably, the highest returns occur following months with the highest volatility, exactly opposite same month returns. Variations do persist, as seen by the continued higher standard deviations and return spreads in the month after high volatility. But as volatility subsides, the market tends to recover, sometimes quite strongly as seen for example after the big volatility spikes from the Great Financial Crisis and COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, at the end of April 2025, markets partly recovered from the earlier lows of the month. This pattern is a cautionary tale for those tempted to sell when markets fall and get volatile.

Volatility and Segments of the Market

These results show how the stock market as a whole performs across volatility regimes, but what about different segments of the market? Perhaps some do better than others in periods of high volatility?

I first examine the performance of factors — groups of stocks defined by certain characteristics. For example, a common academic version of the value factor, HML, is given by the return of the highest 30% of stocks by book-to-market (B/M) minus the lowest 30%. Making use of factors in forming portfolios not only gives the potential for higher returns, but also provides a more diversified portfolio[vii]. I use common definitions from the Ken French data library, but variations are possible. For example, making use of multiple metrics (e.g. including earnings, sales and cash flow relative to price in value) or using contextual definitions can improve factor performance. I show only the average returns by volatility environment to save space, but suffice it to say that again there is plenty of variation around those averages[viii], which makes trying to time these factors difficult.

Exhibit 3: Monthly factor returns (in %) of U.S. stocks dependent on volatility, July 1963 – December 2024. Factor definitions are given in the text.

Source: Ken French data library, Bridgeway calculations

The top row of numbers is the market beta factor or equity risk premium, which measures the return of the stock market relative to the risk-free rate of cash, as represented by one-month Treasury bills. We see a very similar picture as in Exhibit 2: stocks do best relative to cash in low volatility months and worst in high volatility months. But in the month after high volatility, stocks outperform the most.

The next two factors, SMB and HML, represent the excess returns of small size and value. These factors form the core of many academic factor pricing models and are the basis for common equity portfolio classifications such as small value or large growth funds. When volatility is high, riskier small stocks tend to suffer and lag larger stocks. But these beaten-down small stocks typically recover much of those losses in the following month. Value stocks, on the other hand, display no notable pattern, generally doing well no matter the volatility environment. In the month following high volatility episodes, value excess returns tend to be weaker but are still positive.

RMW represents the premium of stocks with robust versus weak profitability. While always positive no matter the volatility environment, it performs best when volatility is high and investors might seek higher quality companies with better profitability. As seen with other measures, this behavior reverts in the following month to a lower albeit positive premium. CMA refers to the premium of stocks with more conservative growth in assets relative to firms that are more aggressive. Again we see a flight to quality in times of higher volatility, which while lower the following month, remains higher than other volatility environments as well as the overall average.

The following two factors are based on return patterns. UMD measures medium-term momentum and STREV gives one-month reversals. Momentum is strong overall except in months of high volatility and the subsequent month as well. This is consistent with the findings and explanation of “When and Why Does Momentum Work – and Not Work?”[ix] which noted that volatile markets can disrupt the trend following that momentum relies upon. Conversely, short-term reversals perform best in the month after high volatility. This is consistent with what we saw for the stock market overall. On average, the market falls when volatility spikes but then reverses the next month. Similarly, those individual stocks which performed worst subsequently rebound the most in the following month.

I also examined sector returns; results are not shown for brevity. For every sector, returns were by far the worst when volatility was highest, and for all but one sector those returns were negative. This one exception was Utilities, which also had its worst returns when volatility was high, but they were still positive. Utilities tend to pay high dividends, and their returns align with what we see for dividend yield in the final row of Exhibit 3. In times of turmoil, investors tend to seek out the relative safety of higher dividends.

Implications for Investors

The recent spike in market volatility is the fourth highest in the past 60 years and has coincided with a stock market drawdown. Such behavior is typical for periods of higher volatility. Higher volatility and drawdowns are features of the stock market, and lead to the equity risk premium – the long-term outperformance of stocks over less risky investments. Indeed, in the subsequent month after high volatility, stocks as a whole tend to recover, as do beaten down segments of the market such as smaller stocks.

One important implication for investors is to be wary of making big moves when volatility has soared and stocks have dropped. You could well be locking in those losses and risk missing out on the subsequent recovery. A disciplined, systematic approach can help avoid the temptation to make kneejerk reactions. Investors should build a well-diversified portfolio that can help them withstand, both financially and emotionally, the inevitable shocks that arise. Diversification can be from other asset classes; it can also come from utilizing other factors besides market beta as sources of return. Most of these factors hold up well on average both overall and during periods of high volatility. Disciplined rebalancing and appropriate risk controls can help preserve the power of diversification and reduce downside risk during volatile times. Investors may also want to consider an allocation to absolute return strategies that are uncorrelated to the market. Keeping these points in mind can help you stay calm during periods of turbulence.


[i] See https://bridgeway.com/perspectives/factoring-in-inflation/ for a discussion of inflation and investing.

[ii] See https://bridgeway.com/perspectives/stress-test-how-factors-perform-before-during-and-after-recessions/ for a discussion of investing around recessions.

[iii] See Berkin, Andrew L. 2018. “What Happens to Stocks When Interest Rates Rise?” Journal of Investing 27 (2): 126-135.

[iv] See https://bridgeway.com/perspectives/factoring-in-bear-markets/ for a discussion of investing in a bear market.

[v] https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.

[vi] Note this is the standard deviation of monthly returns over the full set of 738 months. This is different from the calculation of market volatility of Exhibit 1, which gives the standard deviation of daily returns for each month.

[vii] See “Your Complete Guide to Factor-Based Investing: The Way Smart Money Invests Today” by Andrew L. Berkin and Larry E. Swedroe, BAM Alliance Press, 2016 for a discussion of factors and their use in forming a more diversified portfolio.

[viii] The full set of results is available upon request.

[ix] Berkin, Andrew L. 2021. “When and Why Does Momentum Work – and Not Work?” Journal of Investing 30 (5): 35-54.

DISCLOSURES

The opinions expressed here are exclusively those of Bridgeway Capital Management (“Bridgeway”). Information provided herein is educational in nature and for informational purposes only and should not be considered investment, legal, or tax advice.

Past performance is not indicative of future results.

Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal. In addition, market turbulence and reduced liquidity in the markets may negatively affect many issuers, which could adversely affect client accounts.

Diversification neither assures a profit nor guarantees against loss in a declining market.

The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) is a real-time index that measures the U.S. stock market’s expectations of the 30-day expected volatility – or how much and how quickly stock prices are anticipated to change.

The Russell 3000® Index measures the performance of the largest 3,000 US companies designed to represent approximately 98% of the investable US equity market. The Russell 3000 Index is constructed to provide a comprehensive, unbiased and stable barometer of the broad market and is completely reconstituted annually to ensure new and growing equities are included.

One cannot invest directly in an index.  Index returns do not reflect fees, expenses, or trading costs associated with an actively managed portfolio.

Jacob Pozharny Head of International Equity at Bridgeway bio image

Jacob Pozharny, PhD

Globe, chains and shipping containers illustration

Key Points

  1. Market Neutral Strategies May Offer Protection During Trade Wars
    By balancing long and short positions, market neutral strategies aim to generate returns independent of overall market direction. This approach can help shield portfolios from the volatility and disruptions caused by tariffs and global trade tensions.
  2. Diversified, Multi-Dimensional Neutrality Generally Reduces Risk Exposure
    Effective market neutral portfolios manage risk by maintaining neutrality across multiple dimensions — including sector, country, currency, market beta, and company size. This structure is designed to prevent concentrated exposure to trade-related shocks and mitigates the risk that any single event or region disproportionately affects returns.
  3. Returns Driven by Stock Selection, Not Market Timing
    With broad market risks neutralized, stock selection relies on a steadfast approach using strategies like sentiment analysis, liquidity screening, monitoring industry momentum vs. stock-specific reversals, and using dynamic, real-time risk models. This is intended to enable portfolios to capitalize on inefficiencies without needing to predict geopolitical events.

As global trade tensions escalate and tariffs create significant market uncertainty, investors face increased volatility and potential portfolio declines. Tariffs disrupt established supply chains, increase costs for businesses and consumers, and often trigger retaliatory measures that further destabilize markets. These factors create an environment where traditional long-only investment approaches may struggle. At Bridgeway Capital Management, our market neutral Absolute Return strategies are designed to deliver uncorrelated returns that can thrive during such uncertain periods.

Our Absolute Return strategies employ both long and short positions designed to generate returns regardless of overall market direction. Unlike traditional approaches that only profit in rising markets, our strategies can capitalize on both overvalued stocks (through short positions) and undervalued opportunities (through long positions). This balanced approach allows us to potentially profit from the market dislocations that trade wars create while maintaining a protective posture against broader market declines. By neutralizing market exposure, we aim to provide investors with a valuable diversification tool during periods when conventional investments face heightened risk.

Portfolio Design: Keys to Managing Trade War Risks

In our market neutral portfolio, the dollar amounts invested in long and short positions are equal, in attempt to neutralize overall market exposure. This aggregate portfolio long vs short balance and other market neutral portfolio constraints allow our strategy to potentially profit from both rising and falling stock prices, resulting in a return stream uncorrelated to the broader market.

To build a market neutral portfolio resilient to trade war risks, Bridgeway employs a highly diversified approach. Our Long portfolios typically hold over 250 stocks, while our Short portfolios often exceed 300 names, selected from a universe of more than 10,000 stocks across 35+ countries and all 11 market sectors. With a vast investment universe to choose from, the strategy can be highly selective in its positions, avoiding over-concentration in any one company, sector, country, or currency that might be particularly vulnerable to trade tensions.

This breadth is combined with carefully engineered neutrality constraints across multiple systemic risk dimensions such as:

  • Sector Neutrality: Sector Neutrality is a portfolio construction constraint aimed at equalizing long and short allocations within each market sector to reduce the impact of trade actions targeted at specific industries. Most of our sector exposures are less than 3%.
  • Country Neutrality: Country neutrality is a key principle for managing the risks associated with international investing, particularly in the context of a global trade war. By maintaining balanced long and short positions within each country, a market neutral portfolio can effectively neutralize its exposure to country-specific risks, such as changes in trade policies, geopolitical events, or economic conditions. This approach also implies cost-effective currency neutrality, as the strategy’s net exposure to each country’s currency is minimized. When a strategy has equal long and short positions in a given country, any gains or losses from currency fluctuations on the long side will be offset by corresponding losses or gains on the short side. By keeping the majority of country exposures under 3%, our well-diversified market neutral portfolio is designed to further reduce its vulnerability to any single country’s trade war-related risks, while still maintaining the flexibility to capitalize on attractive opportunities in specific markets.
  • Beta Neutrality: Beta is a measure of a stock’s or portfolio’s sensitivity to broader market movements. A beta neutral portfolio aims to achieve a beta close to zero, meaning its performance is largely independent of market swings. This is particularly valuable during trade disputes, which can trigger heightened market volatility. By balancing the beta of long and short positions, a market neutral hedge strategy can insulate its performance from the shocks and swings that trade wars can bring, providing a degree of stability in uncertain times.
  • Size Neutrality: Size neutrality is an important aspect of portfolio construction in a market neutral portfolio, particularly in the context of a global trade war. By maintaining a similar distribution of market capitalizations in both the long and short portfolios, the strategy can mitigate the risk of its performance being overly influenced by the divergent fortunes of large and small companies, often impacted differently by tariffs.

By diligently pursuing neutrality across these risk dimensions, the strategy is designed to sidestep many of the risks posed by the tensions and gyrations of trade wars.

Illustration of two opposing fists with China and United States flag symbols on sleeves

Breadth and Neutrality in Action: Navigating Trade War Scenarios

Trade wars create asymmetric impacts across sectors, countries, and company sizes, generating volatility for directly affected entities. A well-constructed market neutral portfolio with comprehensive neutrality across multiple dimensions (sector, country, currency, beta, and size) may offer effective protection against these disruptions. Let’s examine how this approach functions across various trade conflict scenarios.

When China imposes agricultural tariffs on the U.S., or when the U.S. and Europe exchange food and beverage tariffs, our sector neutrality aims to ensure that declining long positions in affected industries are offset by gains in our short positions that are also declining in value in the same sectors. This principle applies equally when automotive tariffs escalate between trading partners or when supply chain disruptions affect technology companies dependent on restricted materials like rare earth minerals.

Country and currency neutrality prevent overexposure to nation-specific risks by balancing long and short positions within each country, naturally hedging against currency fluctuations triggered by trade disputes. Beta neutrality minimizes sensitivity to broader market moves that can result from trade tensions. While large multinationals—common in industries such as technology, consumer staples, pharmaceuticals, and automobiles—often have the flexibility and resources to navigate tariffs, their global reach can also increase exposure to international trade barriers. In contrast, more locally focused industries like utilities, real estate, regional banks, healthcare providers, and domestic retailers tend to be insulated from tariffs, as their operations and supply chains are primarily domestic. However, the impact of any given tariff ultimately depends on its nature and the industry affected. This is why combining size neutrality—which balances exposures between large and small companies—with sector neutrality—which mitigates net exposure across different sectors—offers a more robust defense. Together, these portfolio construction techniques help mitigate the risk that any single country, currency, company size, or sector disproportionately affects overall returns during periods of global trade disruption.

This multi-dimensional neutrality is designed to create resilience regardless of which sectors become trade war battlegrounds. Whether agricultural products, spirits, automobiles, technology components, or industrial materials like aluminum become targets, our balanced approach maintains portfolio stability. When U.S. farmers lose access to Chinese markets, European food exporters face retaliatory measures, automakers confront higher input costs, tech companies struggle with supply chain disruptions, or manufacturers absorb increased material costs, our neutrality across all five dimensions is intended to mitigate portfolio volatility.

The key advantage of this approach is adaptability without prediction. Rather than attempting to forecast which sectors or countries will be targeted next in unpredictable trade conflicts, our market neutral strategy creates systematic resilience through its comprehensive balancing mechanisms.

Stock Selection Considerations Amidst the Tensions

With all of these neutrality constraints in place, you might wonder how we generate returns. The answer lies in our disciplined and steadfast approach to stock selection. By using portfolio construction for risk mitigation with our neutrality constraints, we remove broad market risks and focus the portfolio’s active risk on our stock picks. Our market neutral portfolio typically maintains a gross exposure of 200% and targets an annualized volatility of 10%, ensuring that the potential for returns comes from identifying individual winners and losers, rather than betting on geo-political trends or passing investment themes. We believe that idiosyncratic returns—those sourced from the breadth of specific company insights—are more consistent and repeatable than trying to profit from predicting countries, sectors, or size effects. In essence, neutrality allows our stock selection skill to shine through as the main driver of performance. 

It’s worthwhile to point to four specific aspects of our stock selection process that are particularly relevant in the current environment:

  • Stock-Specific Liquidity: We believe nimble, forward-looking fundamental analysis becomes exceptionally valuable when navigating the rapidly shifting currents of trade disputes. Our liquid portfolio mandate is designed to create agility, requiring at least $250,000 of daily liquidity in every position to enable swift repositioning as conditions evolve.
  • Sentiment Analysis: During periods of heightened uncertainty such as we are experiencing, our Sentiment models demonstrate that forecasts of company fundamentals consistently outperform historically reported financial statements for stock selection efficacy. We attempt to capitalize on unusual price movements supported by strong volume that quickly express market sentiment, performing daily analysis to decompose where market sentiment is already priced-in and—more crucially—where it remains unrecognized. This approach uncovers idiosyncratic opportunities by distinguishing between stock moves reflecting realistic earnings expectations versus those driven by emotional investor reactions, especially for knowledge-based, high intangible industries. (See Dugar and Pozharny, Financial Analyst Journal, 2021)
  • Industry Momentum vs Stock Price Reversals: Our behavioral research on market microstructure reveals a critical pattern: industries affected by economic shocks (like tariffs) often experience strong directional momentum, while some stocks within these industries frequently demonstrate momentum reversal patterns. When trade actions target a specific industry, we observe initial broad-based reactions across all companies in that sector, regardless of their actual exposure to the tariff. This creates exploitable inefficiencies as the market eventually differentiates between genuinely vulnerable companies and those with minimal exposure or greater adaptability. By identifying industry-level momentum with carefully selected counter-momentum opportunities in specific stocks within the same industry, we can capitalize on both the initial tariff shock and the subsequent rationalization as markets reassess individual company impacts. (See Stein and Pozharny, Risks, 2022)
  • Dynamic Risk Modeling: Rather than relying on conventional risk models built on long-term historical data, we deploy dynamic risk modeling calibrated to current market conditions and recent covariance patterns. Understanding recent global stock price covariances proves far more effective in capturing the systematic risks caused by trade war developments. These more dynamic recent covariance estimates adapt quickly to emerging correlation patterns as trade tensions reshape global market relationships. Commercial risk models estimated during periods of globalization fundamentally miss the mark when applied to today’s trade war environment. This adaptive methodology allows us to respond effectively as trade developments propagate through interconnected global markets with unprecedented speed and complexity.

Your Ally in Uncertain Times

In this period of elevated uncertainty, market neutral strategies warrant serious consideration for a portion of most portfolios. By engineering diversified, neutral exposure and dynamically shifting with evolving risks and opportunities, Bridgeway’s Absolute Return strategies aim to chart a steady course through the choppiest market conditions.

We invite you to contact Bridgeway to discuss how our market neutral strategies are currently positioned, where we see mispricing of market sentiment, and the role our insights can play in your portfolio. Together, we can strive to transform the challenges of a global trade war into opportunities for uncorrelated returns.

Additional Readings

  • Dugar, A., & Pozharny, J. (2021). Equity investing in the age of intangibles. Financial Analyst Journal, March 2021.
  • Stein, H, & Pozharny, J. (2022). Modeling Momentum and Reversals. Risks, September 2022.

DISCLOSURES

The opinions expressed here are exclusively those of Bridgeway Capital Management (“Bridgeway”). Information provided herein is educational in nature and for informational purposes only and should not be considered investment, legal, or tax advice.

Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal. In addition, market turbulence and reduced liquidity in the markets may negatively affect many issuers, which could adversely affect investor accounts.

Diversification neither assures a profit nor guarantees against loss in a declining market.

Jacob Pozharny Head of International Equity at Bridgeway bio image

Jacob Pozharny, PhD

The traditional rulebook for evaluating companies is becoming obsolete. Today’s most valuable corporate assets are invisible – they exist in lines of code, neural networks, and the collective knowledge of technical teams. While balance sheets excel at capturing the worth of factories and equipment, they fail to reflect the true value of artificial intelligence (“AI”) capabilities that increasingly drive corporate success.

Investing in the Age of AI: Why Intangible Assets Matter More Than Ever

The Art of Valuation in the Age of AI

Traditional manufacturers, with their tangible assets of plants and machinery, often trade near book value. Their worth is readily apparent – you can walk through their facilities and touch their assets. Yet many of today’s most valuable companies, those heavily invested in AI, command valuations at 15 times book value or higher. Their true worth resides in assets you cannot see:

  • Sophisticated algorithms that improve with each interaction
  • Vast databases that feed machine learning systems
  • Research teams pushing the boundaries of AI capabilities
  • Network effects that create exponential value as user bases grow

This fundamental shift demands a new valuation framework. Applying traditional metrics designed for industrial-era companies to AI-driven enterprises misses crucial value drivers.

At Bridgeway Capital Management, our Absolute Return stock selection models recognize that effective investment analysis must be contextual – adapting our process to understand how value is created differently across sectors in this new AI-driven economy.

Why Traditional Accounting Misses the Mark

Financial statements systematically understate both earnings and book value when companies invest heavily in intangibles, including, but not limited to AI:

Earnings Distortion:

  • Research and  development (“R&D”) expenses are immediately written off rather than capitalized and amortized
  • Training and workforce development costs reduce current earnings despite creating future value
  • Marketing spending to build brand value appears as an expense despite building lasting customer relationships

Cash Flow Complications:

  • High initial investment periods show negative free cash flow despite building valuable capabilities
  • Traditional free cash flow metrics don’t distinguish between investment in growth versus maintenance
  • Working capital metrics fail to capture investment in data and intellectual property

Book Value Understated:

  • Successfully developed internal software has zero book value
  • Accumulated organizational knowledge shows as zero on balance sheets
  • Brand value built through marketing appears nowhere in assets

Real-World Impact Across Industries

Software/Tech:

  • Google’s AI language models like BERT and LaMDA require massive R&D investment that appears as pure expense, despite creating foundational technology that powers multiple revenue streams
  • TikTok’s recommendation algorithm development costs are expensed immediately, yet this AI system drives unprecedented user engagement and advertising value
  • NVIDIA’s AI software development appears as current expense despite creating lasting competitive advantages in AI acceleration

Media/Entertainment:

  • Disney’s investment in AI-powered content recommendation and production tools shows as cost despite enhancing streaming engagement
  • Netflix’s spending on AI for personalization and content optimization reduces current earnings but builds valuable predictive capabilities
  • Meta’s AI content moderation system development appears as expense despite creating platform value

Retail:

  • Costco’s AI inventory management and demand forecasting investments reduce reported profits while building lasting efficiency gains
  • Nike’s AI-driven design and customization platform development costs mask future revenue potential
  • Amazon’s robotics and AI logistics investments appear as expenses despite creating powerful automated fulfillment capabilities
Investing in the Age of AI: Why Intangible Assets Matter More Than Ever

The Bridgeway Advantage

We believe a few advantages of our Absolute Return contextual stock selection based on intangible capital intensity include:

  1. Emphasizes valuation metric relevancy based on intangible intensity
  2. Recognizes how R&D and human capital are valued differently across industries
  3. Adjusts for different sentiment and profitability patterns across sectors
  4. Identifies irrational exuberance in AI-driven business models

In an era where the most valuable assets are invisible, you need an investment approach that sees the full picture. That’s the Bridgeway difference.

Additional Readings

DISCLOSURE

The opinions expressed here are exclusively those of Bridgeway Capital Management (“Bridgeway”). Information provided herein is educational in nature and for informational purposes only and should not be considered investment, legal, or tax advice.

Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal. In addition, market turbulence and reduced liquidity in the markets may negatively affect many issuers, which could adversely affect investor accounts.

Diversification neither assures a profit nor guarantees against loss in a declining market.

Jacob Pozharny Head of International Equity at Bridgeway bio image

Jacob Pozharny, PhD

In the world of investing, it’s easy to focus on what you can see and touch. Factories churning out products, stores packed with inventory, piles of cash on the balance sheet – these are the things that have traditionally defined a company’s assets.

But in today’s fast-paced, innovation-driven economy, there’s a less visible class of assets that are proving just as important, if not more so. These are called intangible assets, and while you can’t see or touch them, they’re the secret sauce behind many of the world’s most successful companies.

The Power of Ideas, Brands, and People

So, what exactly are intangible assets? Simply put, they’re the non-physical things that give a company its edge. Think about it like this:

– It’s the unique technology that powers TikTok’s video feed

  • It’s the beloved characters and stories that keep Disney fans coming back
  • It’s the design savvy and user-friendly features that make Apple products so popular
  • It’s the wealth of customer data that helps Amazon target its offerings and keep shoppers loyal

In other words, intangible assets are the ideas, the brands, the talent, and the relationships that set a company apart from the pack.

Sketches in marker on glass with hands reaching out

The Trouble with Traditional Valuation

Current accounting standards require companies to report physical assets like factories and trucks on their balance sheets, but do not mandate similar disclosure for intangible assets common in the new economy, such as intellectual property, data, or brand value. In fact, when a company invests in creating new software or training its employees, it actually looks like they’re losing money in the short term.

This can make it hard to accurately judge the value of companies that rely heavily on intangible assets. If you only look at traditional measures like profits and physical assets, you might miss out on the huge potential of these asset-light, knowledge-based companies.

representation using tipping scales of High and Low intangible capital investing firm

Contextual Stock Selection in Absolute Return Strategies

At Bridgeway, we understand that in today’s economy, you need a new playbook for picking stocks. That’s why we’ve developed a unique approach that helps us spot the hidden value in intangible assets in our absolute return stock selection models.

We start by dividing industries into two groups based on Intangible Capital Intensity. For the New Economy industries which include “High Intangible Capital Intensity” companies, we look beyond the financial statements to emphasize market sentiment that isn’t priced into the stock price. For the Old Economy industries which include “Low Intangible Capital Intensity” companies, we emphasize the tried-and-true methods of analyzing profits, cash flow, and physical assets.

By using this two-pronged approach, we’re able to find promising investment opportunities that others might overlook based on old-fashion valuation methods.

Investing in the Intangible Future

As the world becomes increasingly driven by knowledge, innovation, and brand power, we believe that understanding the impact of intangible assets on stock selection will be key to successful investing.

At Bridgeway, our unique perspective allows us to navigate this new landscape and build absolute return portfolios that we believe are positioned to thrive in the intangible economy. By seeing the potential in ideas, people, and relationships, we aim to unlock value that others might miss.

Additional Readings

DISCLOSURE

The opinions expressed here are exclusively those of Bridgeway Capital Management (“Bridgeway”). Information provided herein is educational in nature and for informational purposes only and should not be considered investment, legal, or tax advice.

Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal. In addition, market turbulence and reduced liquidity in the markets may negatively affect many issuers, which could adversely affect investor accounts.

Diversification neither assures a profit nor guarantees against loss in a declining market.

Jacob Pozharny Head of International Equity at Bridgeway bio image

Jacob Pozharny, PhD

Quantitative investment processes may appear as a “black box” to potential clients—opaque, complex, and difficult to understand. This perception may cause allocators to be concerned that purely quantitative models could overlook critical real-world developments or fail unpredictably under certain market circumstances.

Here at Bridgeway Capital Management, LLC (“Bridgeway”), for our absolute return strategies, we systematically grade stocks within our investment framework. This process emphasizes how we actively acknowledge and evaluate areas of uncertainty, demonstrating our strength in clearly identifying what we don’t know, cannot confidently measure, where there is uncertainty, or where we feel externalities threaten the assumptions underlying our models.  By transparently sharing how our methodology adapts to real-world conditions and uncertainties, we seek to reinforce trust, deepen client understanding, and differentiate our approach in the marketplace.

What is Systematic Investing?

Investing can often feel unpredictable, but at our firm, we take a disciplined, evidence-based approach to financial statement analysis. Systematic investing relies on methodically evaluating financial statements using models to remove emotion from decision-making. Rather than chasing trends or reacting to market noise, we use a structured process to assess investment opportunities, in an attempt to ensure that every decision is backed by rigorous analysis.

However, financial data alone is not enough. One of our greatest strengths is knowing what we know—and just as importantly, acknowledging what we don’t. External forces—such as regulatory changes, leadership shifts, or geopolitical events—can impact a company’s performance in ways traditional models can’t predict. That’s why we evaluate our model assumptions consistently and adjust for externalities, ensuring that our investment process remains both robust and adaptive.  After our computers calculate a numerical score for each stock in our investment universe, our investment team assigns a letter grade (A,B,..,F) to the most relevant investment opportunities for international and absolute return portfolios.

How We Adjust for Externalities

Our investment team continuously monitors externalities that can affect a company’s outlook. When we identify an event outside the prediction scope of our models, we adjust the stock’s rating to reflect increased uncertainty, recognizing that new risks or changes in conditions may not yet be fully understood. Specifically:

  • A stock rated A (bullish) will be muted to C (neutral) if an externality introduces new risk that adds uncertainty to our conviction.
  • A stock rated F (bearish) will be muted to C (neutral) if an externality suggests a potential improvement that we cannot yet quantify.

These adjustments are not about making predictions—they are about acknowledging that some events create uncertainty beyond what models can immediately measure. By tempering extreme ratings in response to externalities, we avoid overconfidence and endeavor for a balanced, risk-aware investment process.

Key Externalities We Monitor

We use advanced news screening tools from Bloomberg and FactSet to strive to identify impactful externalities in a timely fashion across several categories including:

  1. Regulatory Shifts
    • Rapid changes in environmental regulations.
    • Government price caps impacting profitability.
    • Unforeseen tax policy adjustments.
    • Trading restrictions and currency repatriation limitations.
  2. Leadership Transitions
    • Executive changes that can lead to market reaction.
    • Scandals or controversies affecting investor confidence.
  3. Corporate Events & Actions
    • Stock splits, spin-offs, and special dividends.
    • Unexpected consequences of corporate takeovers
  4. Geopolitical and Economic Shocks
    • Market volatility due to election outcomes.
    • Economic impacts of geopolitical conflicts and legal rulings.
    • Global disruptions from unexpected events.
  5. Market Innovations & Disruptions
    • Regulatory decisions that can lead to sudden stock movements.
    • Supply chain shocks disrupting operations.
  6. Insider & Government Activity
    • Insider trading leading to sudden market reaction.
    • Congressional trading activity that can move stock prices.
  7. Other Unforeseen Market Forces
    • Social media-driven stock movements.
    • Emerging human rights concerns and legal challenges.

Why This Matters for Investors

While many investment firms rely purely on historical data and quantitative models, one way we differentiate ourselves is by systematically adjusting for real-world externalities. Our ability to recognize what we don’t know—and adjust accordingly—assists us in creating an investment process that is:

  • More Risk-Aware – We strive to proactively temper exposure to external risks before they impact returns.
  • More Adaptive – We don’t ignore real-world developments; we integrate them into our decision-making.
  • More Intelligent – By balancing systematic rigor with real-world awareness, we seek to create a smarter, more resilient portfolio.

At Bridgeway, we go beyond traditional quantitative investing by evaluating externalities as part of our systematic investment process. This helps us with our goal to consistently deliver better risk-adjusted returns for our investors even in these unpredictable and volatile times.

DISCLOSURE

The opinions expressed here are exclusively those of Bridgeway. Information provided herein is educational in nature and for informational purposes only and should not be considered investment, legal, or tax advice.

Past performance is not indicative of future results.

Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal. In addition, market turbulence and reduced liquidity in the markets may negatively affect many issuers, which could adversely affect client accounts.

Diversification neither assures a profit nor guarantees against loss in a declining market.

Andy Berkin Head of Research at Bridgeway bio image

Andrew L. Berkin, PhD

Kai Liu Research Analyst at Bridgeway bio image

Kai Liu, CFA

Key Points:

  • As the largest stocks in the S&P 500 rise to historic levels, the effective number of stocks driving this index has fallen to below 50.
  • Such concentration presents risks, and previous periods have been followed by weaker returns.
  • Possibilities to mitigate this risk include large cap strategies with more equal weighting, better diversified and cheaper small cap value stocks, and alternative strategies independent of market direction.

How many stocks are effectively in the S&P 500 index of large cap stocks? Let’s start with a simpler question by removing “effectively”: how many stocks are in the S&P 500? Even this question is not straightforward, as stock indices don’t always have a count which matches the number in its name. The Wilshire 5000 is designed to represent the entire US stock market and has had notably greater or less than 5000 stocks. The Russell 1000 and 2000 indices have only roughly those numbers due to corporate actions and grandfathering rules. The S&P 500 does have 500 companies, but as of the end of 2024 had 503 holdings because three companies (Alphabet, Fox and News Corp) have multiple share classes in the index.

Now let’s return to the original question: how many stocks are effectively in the S&P 500? Because the S&P 500 is float weighted, larger stocks have a much greater weight than smaller stocks. These smaller stocks, some with weights just over 0.01%, have minimal impact on the characteristics and returns of the index. The largest stock, Apple, had a weight of 7.6% at the end of 2024, equivalent to the weight of the smallest 217 companies.

How can we measure the effective number of holdings? Statistics has an answer, based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). While it sounds like a mouthful, the concept is straightforward, so bear with us for a moment. The HHI is a measure of concentration and is simply the sum of the weights squared, and can range from 0 to 1. The inverse of the HHI gives the effective number of holdings.

As an example, consider a portfolio of 10 stocks. If they have equal weight, each will be at 10% or 0.1 of the portfolio. Square 0.1 to get 0.01, then add up the 10 stocks to get an HHI of 0.1. Now invert the HHI: 1/0.1 is 10, which makes sense: each of the 10 stocks contributes equally. Next consider the case where one stock has 91% of the weight and the other nine stocks each have 1%. The HHI is now 0.83, indicating high concentration. Inverting it gives 1.2, barely over 1. The portfolio is dominated by the single large holding, with the other nine stocks having very small contributions.

The plot below shows the effective number of stocks in the S&P 500 since 1970. We have treated multiple share classes as a single stock by adding their weights, since the two share classes provide exposure to the same company. To answer the question posed by the title of this piece, the effective number of stocks was just over 46 at the end of 2024. This is the lowest number in the last 55 years. Perhaps this is not too shocking when the “Magnificent Seven” stocks (Apple, Nvidia, Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet, Meta and Tesla) have over a third of the total weight of the index. The plot shows two other periods of high concentration: the Tech Bubble of the late 1990s and the Nifty Fifty craze of the early 1970s. See our piece “Party Like It’s 1972” for a comparison of those episodes with recent events.

S&P Holdings Chart
Source: Refinitiv, S&P Global Ratings, CRSP, Compustat, Bridgeway calculations

Why should an investor care about concentration? One important reason is that such a high weight in a few stocks leads to a greater influence on returns and reduces diversification, called the one free lunch in investing. If the returns of those higher weight stocks begin to lag, they drag down the returns of the entire S&P 500. Indeed, this is what we observe following past periods of high concentration.

The graph below shows the HHI in blue on the left axis. Recall this measure of concentration is simply the inverse of the effective number of stocks. We see the current historic high concentration of the S&P 500, as well as peaks during the Nifty Fifty Craze and Tech Bubble. But these periods did not end well for investors, as we can see from the strongly negative returns in the early 1970s and early 2000s. And it was the stocks which had grown to be such a big weight in the index which led the way down. Note that the orange line of forward returns ends 12 months before the HHI. We don’t know what future returns will be, but the high concentration and low effective number of stocks in the S&P 500 could be viewed as a cautionary signal.

This is not a call to try to time the market. The plot does show that concentration and returns have fallen after reaching new highs, but both can keep increasing before that reversal. And other factors drive the market as well; there are jumps and falls unrelated to concentration. But history tells us that high concentration can be a warning sign. Investors may want to revisit their risk and return assumptions together with their portfolio allocations and consider appropriate actions.

S&P 500 Concentration and Forward 1Y Return
Source: Refinitiv, S&P Global Ratings, CRSP, Compustat, Bridgeway calculations. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index described in the text and is on the left axis. Return of the S&P 500 is on the right axis.

What steps could investors take? One thought is to consider a large cap strategy with less concentration in the largest names. But there are caveats. An equal weighted S&P 500 offers the greatest diversification across these names, and since 1970 would have offered higher returns as well. However, giving the same weight to these 500 stocks both big and small gives the portfolio a more mid cap tilt. The weighted average market cap of the S&P 500 at the end of 2024 was over a trillion dollars[1]. For the equal weighted version, the average market cap was ten times less at about $100 billion dollars. But an equal weighted version of the largest 50 firms, roughly the number of effective holdings in the S&P 500, had an average market cap of $600 billion dollars. This is much closer to that of the index, and the weight of the Magnificent Seven is reduced to 14% from over a third.

Another suggestion is to revisit the allocation to small cap value stocks. One concern about such high concentration in the S&P 500 is that it also becomes quite expensive, with a P/E ratio at the end of 2024 of 27.4[2]. Not only is this quite high, but it is a very large spread compared to the P/E of the small cap Russell 2000 Value index at 13.8. While US stocks as a whole have gone up, the rally has been led by the mega cap growth stocks. Small value stocks still trade at quite reasonable valuations, with the smallest deep value names especially trading at a discount. Investors may want to revisit their allocation to this segment of the market. Similarly, international stocks also trade at discounted valuations to the S&P 500.

A final suggestion is to consider an allocation to alternatives which are uncorrelated to equities. Such strategies always have a potential role to play in a portfolio, with their diversification benefits. With the S&P 500 so highly concentrated and expensive, now is a particularly appropriate time for investors to reexamine their allocations within large cap stocks and to small value and international equities as well as to alternatives.

DISCLOSURES

The opinions expressed here are exclusively those of Bridgeway Capital Management (“Bridgeway”). Information provided herein is educational in nature and for informational purposes only and should not be considered investment, legal, or tax advice.

Past performance is not indicative of future results.

Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal. In addition, market turbulence and reduced liquidity in the markets may negatively affect many issuers, which could adversely affect client accounts.

Diversification neither assures a profit nor guarantees against loss in a declining market.

The S&P 500 Index is a broad-based, unmanaged measurement of changes in stock market conditions based on the average of 500 widely held common stocks.

One cannot invest directly in an index.  Index returns do not reflect fees, expenses, or trading costs associated with an actively managed portfolio.


[1] Source for market cap calculations: Refinitive, S&P Global Ratings, CRSP,Compustat and Bridgeway.

[2] Source for P/E ratios: FactSet and Bridgeway.

Built for Institutions, Now Open to Retail Investors, the Fund to Close at $150 Million

Houston, TX – October 22nd, 2024 – Bridgeway Capital Management, an investment firm focused on stewardship and long-term, disciplined, processes grounded in academic theory and fundamental insights, is pleased to announce the launch of Bridgeway Global Opportunities Fund (BRGOX). The fund is available to trade today on Schwab and Fidelity platforms.

Based on Bridgeway’s extensive research including, three peer-reviewed articles on Intangible Capital Intensity, the Fund seeks to consistently deliver strong returns regardless of stock market direction. The Fund is a systematic global absolute–return strategy that employs a long/short approach and maintains low net exposure to countries, sectors and certain other undesirable exposures. BRGOX is being offered as a traditional mutual fund with a soft close around $150M. Once reached, the adviser intends to offer the strategy to new investors only through a hedge fund (“long-short”) investment vehicle or similar structure, and at a higher fee.

“We are confident that Bridgeway Global Opportunities Fund will be a valuable addition for risk–aware investors seeking to build resilient, diversified portfolios with reduced exposure to systematic risks,” said John Montgomery, Founder and CEO at Bridgeway Capital Management. “The Global Opportunities strategy structurally benefits from Bridgeway’s experience over three decades in managing capacity constrained funds, plus our nimbleness in the market relative to much larger competitors.”

“The launch of Bridgeway Global Opportunities Fund reflects our commitment to providing investors with innovative solutions in this evolving market environment,” said Jacob Pozharny, Co-CIO and Portfolio Manager for the Fund. “Traditionally, only high-net-worth and institutional investors have had access to hedge fund like strategies. This fund is designed to be agnostic with respect to the stock market direction and intended to address increasing correlation across global markets by aiming to deliver attractive and consistent risk–adjusted returns through a blend of diversification and reduced volatility.  

For a comprehensive overview of the Bridgeway Global Opportunities investment approach, please review the firm’s Measuring Intangible Capital Intensity: A Global Analysis under the Perspectives Page of our website.

For more information about the Bridgeway Global Opportunities Fund and Bridgeway Capital Management, please visit https://bridgeway.com

About Bridgeway Capital Management

Bridgeway Capital Management, Inc., the Adviser to Bridgeway Funds, was founded in Houston in July 1993, and manages approximately $4.3 billion in six mutual funds, two ETFs, as well as separately managed and sub-advised accounts. With a focus on long–term, disciplined, statistical processes grounded in academic theory and fundamental insights, Bridgeway’s research–driven strategies are committed to delivering exceptional returns for its clients. Bridgeway is also known for its unique culture and donates 50% of profits to charitable causes.

Media Contact

Tyler Bradford
Hewes Communications
212-207-9454
tyler@hewescomm.com 

Disclosures

Before investing you should carefully consider the Fund’s investment objectives, risks, charges, and expenses. This and other information is in the prospectus, a copy of which may be obtained by calling 800-661-3550 or visiting the Fund’s website at bridgewayfunds.com. Please read the prospectus carefully before you invest.

Investing involves risk. Principal loss is possible. The Fund’s use of derivatives, swaps, and leverage can magnify the risk of loss in an unfavorable market, and the Fund’s use of short-sale positions can, in theory, expose shareholders to unlimited loss. The Fund invests in foreign securities, which involve greater volatility and political, economic, and currency risks, and differences in accounting methods. These risks are greater in emerging markets. The Fund is new and has no operating history.

Diversification does not assure a profit, nor does it protect against a loss in a declining market.

The Fund is distributed by Foreside Fund Services, LLC, which is not affiliated with Bridgeway Capital Management, LLC ™ or any other affiliate.

Christine Wang Portfolio Manager at Bridgeway bio image

Christine Wang, CFA, CPA

Andy Berkin Head of Research at Bridgeway bio image

Andrew L. Berkin, PhD

Highlights

  • Small-cap value stocks have lagged the large-cap S&P 500 by significant amounts so far in 2024.
  • This dispersion of returns has led to small-cap value stocks being extremely cheap compared to
    the S&P 500.
  • Combined with the narrowness of returns within the S&P 500, such conditions have historically
    provided an opportunity for strong reversion, with small-cap value stocks outperforming.


As small-cap value investors, sometimes it feels like you are just Waiting on the World to Change. The Russell 2000 Value Index lagged the S&P 500 Index of large US companies by a significant margin four years in a row from 2017 through 2020. The Russell 2000 Value staged a comeback in early 2021 (see our piece Room to Run), offering glimpses that we had turned a corner, but 2023 and 2024 have reverted to the same chorus. It sometimes feels like we’re stuck with a broken record. 


We at Bridgeway are firm believers in the small and value factors. These drivers of returns are integral parts of our investment process. Using the full history currently available from the Ken French data library (July 1926 – August 2024), we find small-cap value stocks have returned 14.3% annually, compared to 10.2% for the broad market. Not only do these factors historically provide a return premium, but they also meet our criteria of being persistent, pervasive, robust, investable, and intuitive. Furthermore, they provide useful diversification to the overall portfolio. (See the book Your Complete Guide to Factor-Based Investing by Andrew Berkin and Larry Swedroe for further discussion.)

Given small-cap value’s recent performance, where do we stand right now?


Using the standard academic definition of valuation, book-to-market (BtM), we can put into perspective where we are relative to history. The blue line in the chart below shows the ratio of median BtM for the Russell 2000 Value Index to median BtM for the S&P 500. The solid orange line shows the median ratio for the entire history of the Russell 2000 Value from 1978- September 2024. Ratios above this line signal that small-cap value stocks are cheaper than their historical average. 


The first big spike when the Russell 2000 Value was cheaper than the S&P 500 was the dot.com era. Investors did Party Like It’s 1999, favoring high-flying growth stocks over value stocks. Valuations then reverted to the median (yielding five years of double-digit outperformance of the Russell 2000 Value vs. the S&P 500). The 2010s saw valuations creep back up, culminating in a new peak in 2020 of how cheap small-cap value had gotten relative to the S&P500. That reversed dramatically (and quickly) in 2021, bringing relative valuations down but still higher than historical levels. The relative underperformance of small-cap value in 2023 and 2024 has stretched the ratio again, getting us close to, but not yet at the prior peak. This potentially sets the stage for a future reversal with strong small-cap value outperformance.

Since the 2010s, small-cap stocks, represented by the Russell 2000, have faced a similar relationship to the S&P 500 (grey line) as the Russell 2000 Value, becoming far cheaper than their median (yellow 

– 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 1978 1980 1982 1983 1985 1986 1988 1990 1991 1993 1994 1996 1997 1999 2001 2002 2004 2005 2007 2009 2010 2012 2013 2015 2016 2018 2020 2021 2023 Ratio Median BtM Ratios relative to S&P 500 R2000V / S&P 500 R2000V / S&P 500 median over time R2000 / S&P 500 R2000 / S&P500 median over timeBridgeway Capital Management | 20 Greenway Plaza | Suite 450 | Houston, TX 77046 | bridgeway.com 3 

line). Small caps in general are now even cheaper than the historical median Russell 2000 Value to S&P 500 ratio.


So why stick to small-caps and value in particular? For one, the rally in the S&P 500 has been concentrated in a few stocks. While this is not new (see our piece on the Nifty Fifty), it does mean the rally has lacked breadth. The equal weight S&P 500 lagged the index by over 10% in June 2024. That’s in the worst 3% of six-month periods going back to 1990 when Bloomberg data starts. The equal weight S&P 500 strongly outperformed the index in July as smaller cap names rallied, but still remains in the worst quintile of six-month periods as of September 2024. Small-cap value is incredibly cheap right now and while things could get worse before they get better, we encourage you to Don’t Stop Believin’. Stick with your allocation and rebalance. That would be music to our ears. 

The opinions expressed here are exclusively those of Bridgeway Capital Management (“Bridgeway”). Information provided herein is educational in nature and for informational purposes only and should not be considered investment, legal, or tax advice.

Past performance is not indicative of future results.

Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal. In addition, market turbulence and reduced liquidity in the markets may negatively affect many issuers, which could adversely affect client accounts. Value stocks as a group may be out of favor at times and underperform the overall equity market for long periods while the market concentrates on other types of stocks, such as “growth” stocks.

Diversification neither assures a profit nor guarantees against loss in a declining market.

The S&P 500 Index is a broad-based, unmanaged measurement of changes in stock market conditions based on the average of 500 widely held common stocks.

The Russell 2000 Index is an unmanaged, market value-weighted index, which measures the performance of the 2,000 companies that are between the 1,000th and 3,000th largest in the market. The Russell 2000 Value Index measures the performance of those Russell 2000 companies with lower price-to-book ratios and lower forecasted growth values.

One cannot invest directly in an index. Index returns do not reflect fees, expenses, or trading costs associated with an actively managed portfolio.

Andy Berkin Head of Research at Bridgeway bio image

Andrew L. Berkin, PhD

Christine Wang Portfolio Manager at Bridgeway bio image

Christine Wang, CFA, CPA

Key Points:

  • While stocks have recently seen some big down days, these are hardly unprecedented but rather typical given the volatility of equities.
  • Short-term downturns in the market tell us very little about future returns; stocks tend to go up over time but with a wide variation of outcomes, no matter what recent returns have been.
  • Setting an appropriately diversified asset allocation can help an investor bear the inevitable down days and reap the long-term rewards from holding stocks.

As we write this in early August 2024, markets have recently suffered some large drops. On Thursday August 1 and Friday August 2, the S&P 500 fell 1.37% and 1.84%, followed by a drop of 2.99% on Monday August 5. This was the worst single day return in almost two years and resulted in a three-day loss of just over 6%. As is typical, a variety of reasons have been given, but they seem to center around the Federal Reserve being late in cutting rates as job data weakens, leading to worries about increased chances of a recession. So just how bad is this? And more importantly, what does it mean for the future? To help answer these questions, we turn to historical data.

In some ways, these returns were indeed pretty bad. The one- and three-day returns were both in the worst 1% historically, going back to the start of 1970[1]. And indeed, this was the worst one-day return since September 13, 2022, when the S&P fell 4.32%. On the other hand, these falls are not too bad either. With over 200 trading days in a year, we could naively expect a couple of days a year in the worst 1%. Drops of 3% or 6% are not desirable, but neither are they too extreme. A drop of 10% from a recent peak is typically called a correction, while 20% or more is a bear market. We’re not at those levels. For that matter, does anyone remember what triggered the one-day drop of over 3% two years ago? We sure don’t. While stock markets generally go up over time, it is not in a straight line; one needs to expect some down days.

To get a more complete view of returns over time, the first exhibit shows the distribution of historical three-day returns. The vertical axis gives the count of returns that fall within a given range as shown on the horizontal axis. Over 99% of three-day returns are within +/- 6%; the recent drop we experienced is poor but not a huge outlier. Virtually all returns are within +/- 10%, but the horizontal axis extends further out because there are a few extreme outliers. The worst three-day return was an over 25% drop in October 1987; other down periods occurred during the Great Financial Crisis in the fall of 2008 and Covid in March 2020. The largest three-day return is over 17% and occurs in the market rebound from Covid, with bounce backs during the Great Financial crisis also high on the list.

Source: Datastream, Bridgeway Calculations since 1970

So while recent returns have been weak historically, they are well within typical ranges. But the past is over. What might this mean for the future? Does a bad one-day or three-day return forbode worsening returns ahead? Let’s again turn to historical data.

The second exhibit shows “box and whiskers” plots of the range of future one-year returns[2] grouped according to three-day returns. The three-day returns are broken up into ten groups or deciles; the worst 10% of three-day returns is in decile 10, the far-left plot. These worst 10% of three-day returns range from -1.96% to -25.53%. The box and whiskers plot then shows the range of subsequent one-year returns for each of the deciles. The box shows the range for the middle 50% of all subsequent returns, with the median return given by the horizontal line inside the box. The whiskers extend out from the top and bottom of the box by 1.5 times the height of the box. Outliers beyond that are shown as circles. For example, for decile 10 the middle 50% of subsequent one-year returns range between -0.40% and 28.32%, with median value of 16.48% and min and max values of -46.34% and 77.80%.

Source: Datastream, Bridgeway Calculations since 1970

These box and whiskers plots show us a lot of things. First and foremost, the ten plots all look qualitatively similar. Whether three-day returns are weak or strong, future one-year returns display similar patterns. What are those patterns? Most of the time, the one-year returns are positive. We see this by the range of boxes almost always being positive. The median is always positive. There are outliers, with low returns somewhat worse than -40% and high returns somewhat better than 60% in each of the deciles. Decile 10 (the worst 3-day returns) has the largest variation in returns, but those trying to time the market must note that large moves can happen on both the upside and the downside. We have done the same analysis with subsequent one-month and one-week returns and again found no pattern of future results based on recent returns[3].

The main takeaway here is that whether recent returns have been weak or strong, they tell you very little about what future returns might be – positive or negative. Historically, these returns have typically been nicely positive, but there have been occasions of quite bearish markets. Investors in the stock market have received historically nice returns for bearing the risk that bad periods can occur. Because the market generally goes up no matter what the recent returns, those who are tempted to sell off after a brief downturn such as we have just seen, run the very serious risk of missing out on subsequent gains. And that is not a good recipe for investing success.

Given the unpredictability of future returns, investors are best served by having a diversified asset allocation target that considers their return needs and risk tolerance, and sticking to it, even and especially on big down days. Diversification can provide benefits such as moderating large downfalls in any single strategy. Bonds are a typical diversifier to stocks. Diversification is also possible within equities to other parts of the market that don’t necessarily move in tandem, such as taking on exposure to small caps, other factors such as value, and international stocks. Allocations to alternatives such as absolute return strategies that are uncorrelated to the market help as well. A properly diversified portfolio allows an investor to better stomach the inevitable dips of the stock market roller coaster and reap the long-term rewards it has offered.


[1] We’ve run the results on shorter periods such as the past decade, and longer periods such as back to 1927 using proxies. Results are qualitatively similar; ask if interested. The return data used here is from Datastream.

[2] In this piece we approximate one week, one month, and one year returns by 5, 22, and 252 trading days.

[3] These results are available on request.

DISCLAIMER AND DISCLOSURE

The opinions expressed here are exclusively those of Bridgeway Capital Management (“Bridgeway”). Information provided herein is educational in nature and for informational purposes only and should not be considered investment, legal, or tax advice.

Past performance is not indicative of future results.

Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal. In addition, market turbulence and reduced liquidity in the markets may negatively affect many issuers, which could adversely affect client accounts.

Diversification neither assures a profit nor guarantees against loss in a declining market.

The S&P 500 Index is a broad-based, unmanaged measurement of changes in stock market conditions based on the average of 500 widely held common stocks.

One cannot invest directly in an index. Index returns do not reflect fees, expenses, or trading costs associated with an actively managed portfolio.

Andy Berkin Head of Research at Bridgeway bio image

Andrew L. Berkin, PhD

Jacob Pozharny Head of International Equity at Bridgeway bio image

Jacob Pozharny, PhD

Recently the large cap US S&P 500 index hit an all-time high, closing above its previous high set two years ago in January 2022. Does this mean the S&P 500 is due for an imminent crash?


In the 1920s radio was the hot technology and the stock prices of associated companies soared. The poster child was the Radio Company of America (RCA), whose price rose from $43 a share in 1926 to a peak of $568 in September 19291, with a P/E ratio of 722. The stock market crash that commenced with Black Monday that month brought RCA’s stock price back to Earth, falling to $15 in 1932. It wasn’t until the 1960s that RCA regained its former high. A presumably apocryphal story is of an older man going to a brokerage to sell his long-held RCA shares, proclaiming, “Even money!” Needless to say, having an investment return of nothing for over three decades is not desirable.

Fast forward to the 1980s. Japanese technology, manufacturing, and real estate are on top of the world. On December 29, 1989, Japan’s benchmark Nikkei 225 hit an all-time high of 38,915.87, with a forward P/E ratio of over 503. Japan’s bubble economy subsequently burst, and the Nikkei fell sharply, dropping below 7,000. Fast forward again to recent times. On February 22, 2024, the Nikkei 225 closed at 39,098.68, finally breaking through its prior record high. After a span of over three decades, “Even money!”

Recently the large cap US S&P 500 index also hit an all-time high, closing above its previous high set two years ago in January 2022. Does this mean the S&P 500 is due for an imminent crash? The answer is no. The S&P 500 may fall or rise from here, but hitting an all-time high will not be the reason4. Since stocks tend to go up over time, all-time highs are common events. RCA and the US market hit many all-time highs before crashing in 1929; similarly with the Nikkei prior to its crash in 1989. In those cases, the rise in prices eventually far outstripped the rise in fundamentals, such as earnings, leading to extreme valuations. While the valuation of the S&P 500 today is elevated relative to history, it is below levels of a few years ago as well as in 1929 and 20005.

An important takeaway is that valuations do matter. Certainly, other factors such as quality and sentiment also drive returns, which is why we use them as well as value. Stocks can be cheap for a reason; they can also be expensive for a reason. And there were good reasons for the initial rise of both RCA and the Nikkei. RCA was a leader in both radio manufacturing and broadcasting, hot growth areas at the time. The Japanese economy boomed in the 1980s as exports soared. But as the Wall Street saying goes, “trees don’t grow to the sky”. At some point, stocks can get too expensive, and subsequently fall precipitously6.

If valuations matter, where can one find attractive valuations today? One place is smaller cap stocks, whose returns have lagged their larger cap peers in recent years. Around the world, smaller cap stocks are priced more attractively relative to fundamental measures of value than their larger brethren. This holds true in the United States, other developed markets, and emerging markets. For example, the figure below shows that using Book to Price as a value measure, US small caps are cheaper than US large caps, EAFE (developed markets) small caps are cheaper than EAFE large caps, and EM small caps are cheaper than EM large caps. As noted, valuation is not the only driver, and there are other reasons why smaller cap stocks are attractive. We have discussed the case for smaller cap stocks in the United States7 and emerging markets8 in some recent pieces.

Source: FactSet, Bridgeway analysis

Value stocks do tend to have higher subsequent returns than their more expensive peers, a finding that goes back to at least Benjamin Graham9. For stock indices, Robert Shiller showed cheaper valuations tend to produce higher return over the next ten years (see footnote 5). Thus, valuations can be useful for setting long-run return expectations but have less short-term effect. Structural issues such as liquidity and legal protections also affect valuation levels. For example, the United States tends to have higher valuations than other markets. But if you believe in value investing, small caps are an interesting opportunity.

Note this is not a call to make a major tactical asset allocation shift. As always, diversification is important. And timing shifts in the market is nigh impossible. But for those whose allocation to small caps has moved away from target due to the run up in large cap stocks, rebalancing is well warranted. Given the discrepancy in valuations, investors may wish to revisit their return assumptions and consider an increased allocation to smaller stocks. And for those who have been ignoring smaller cap stocks in any of these markets, now is a good time to consider adding this asset class to your allocation.

  1. See for example “Bubbles and Crashes: The Boom and Bust of Technological Innovation” by Brent Goldfarb and David A. Kirsch. Prices are split adjusted. ↩︎
  2. See https://www.gold-eagle.com/article/rca-1925-1929-and-microsoft-1994-1998-0. ↩︎
  3. Data from Refinitiv; see https://finance.yahoo.com/news/nikkei-parties-1989-scales-record-033844899.html. ↩︎
  4. See also https://www.buckinghamstrategicwealth.com/resources/investing/all-time-market-highs. ↩︎
  5. See for example the Cyclically Adjusted PE (CAPE) ratio, http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm. ↩︎
  6. Also see Party Like It’s 1972 for a discussion of the Nifty Fifty craze of the early 1970s. ↩︎
  7. https://bridgeway.com/perspectives/waiting-on-the-world-to-change-small-cap-value-investors/ ↩︎
  8. https://bridgeway.com/perspectives/why-emerging-markets-small-cap-2/ ↩︎
  9. For a thorough discussion of value, as well as other factors, see “Your Complete Guide to Factor-Based Investing: The Way Smart Money Invests Today” by Andrew L. Berkin and Larry E. Swedroe. ↩︎

DISCLAIMER AND DISCLOSURE

The opinions expressed here are exclusively those of Bridgeway Capital Management (“Bridgeway”). Information provided herein is educational in nature and for informational purposes only and should not be considered investment, legal, or tax advice.

Past performance is not indicative of future results.

Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal. In addition, market turbulence and reduced liquidity in the markets may negatively affect many issuers, which could adversely affect client accounts.

Diversification neither assures a profit nor guarantees against loss in a declining market.

The Price-to-Earnings (P/E) Ratio is the ratio for valuing a company that measures its current share price relative to its earnings per share (EPS). The price-to-earnings ratio is also sometimes known as the price multiple or the earnings multiple.

The book-to-price ratio is a financial metric that compares a company’s current book value to its market value. It’s calculated by dividing the book value per share by the current stock price per share.

The Nikkei 225, also commonly referred to simply as the Nikkei or the Nikkei index, is the leading stock market index for Japan. It tracks the performance of 225 large, publicly traded companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE).

The S&P 500 Index is a broad-based, unmanaged measurement of changes in stock market conditions based on the average of 500 widely held common stocks.

The MSCI EAFE Standard, also known as the MSCI EAFE Index, is an equity index that captures large- and mid-cap representation across 21 developed markets countries around the world, excluding the US and Canada. The MSCI EAFE Small Cap Index is an equity index that captures small cap representation across developed markets countries around the world, excluding the US and Canada.

The MSCI USA Standard, also known as the MSCI USA Index, is designed to measure the performance of the large- and mid-cap segments of the US market. The MSCI USA Small Cap Index is designed to measure the performance of the small-cap segment of the US equity market.

The MSCI EM Standard, also known as the MSCI Emerging Markets Index, captures large- and mid-cap representation across 24 emerging markets countries. The MSCI Emerging Markets (EM) Small Cap Value Index captures small-cap securities exhibiting overall value style characteristics across 24 emerging markets countries.

One cannot invest directly in an index. Index returns do not reflect fees, expenses, or trading costs associated with an actively managed portfolio.