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The killing of George Floyd, Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor, and too many other Black people due to systemic racism and abuse of power in our country is wrong. Black Lives Matter. We cannot turn a blind eye to injustice or be patient with change. We stand in solidarity with the peaceful protesters on the streets of America and around the world demanding justice and reform. But words are never enough.

Bridgeway Capital Management remains steadfast in our longstanding commitment to peace, justice, and compassion. We commit 50% of our profits toward the prevention of oppression, genocide, and human rights violations around the world. Through the Bridgeway Foundation, we have been honored to support organizations leading these efforts in the US, such as the Equal Justice Initiative and the Center for the Healing of Racism.

We can and must do better. In this moment, Bridgeway is committed to deep listening, learning, reflecting, and acting to increase our support for organizations working to end systemic racism in America. We are united in the pursuit of a world free from fear, violence, and the abuse of power, for however long it takes.

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Andy Berkin Head of Research at Bridgeway bio image

Andrew L. Berkin, PhD

Value stocks have been lagging their growth counterparts for some time now, and that difference has only widened. Through the 12 months ending March 31, 2020, the Russell 1000 Value Index (-17.17%) underperformed the Russell 1000 Growth Index (+0.91%) by 18.1%; in small cap stocks the gap was 11.1%.1 Over the past 10 years, that underperformance was 5.3% on an annualized basis in the large cap space (Russell 1000 Value Index minus Russell 1000 Growth Index) and 4.1% on an annualized basis with small caps (Russell 2000 Value Index minus Russell 2000 Growth Index). Some recent articles in the popular press proclaim that value investing may never recover its former long-term advantage, causing investors to wonder if they should shun value-oriented strategies.

There is a natural human tendency to abandon something that has not been working recently. In some situations, this may be the correct move. For example, children learn to be careful with fire after having been burned. Unfortunately, in investing there is evidence that such moves may be largely unsuccessful2, understanding that each individual investor’s suitability is very personal. As every piece of marketing material states, past performance is no guarantee of future results. That holds on the downside as well as the upside. So before abandoning any strategy, it is important to understand what is going on to drive that performance.

We at Bridgeway are firm believers in value. It is an integral part of our investment process. And despite its recent setbacks, we will continue to use it. Why? In my book with Larry Swedroe, “Your Complete Guide to Factor-Based Investing”, we look for a factor to be persistent, pervasive, robust, investable and intuitive. We found that the value factor meets those criteria for our portfolio construction process, and still find that to be the case today.

But wait, you may say, what about persistence? After all, value has been lagging for a while now. But we at Bridgeway are long-term investors, and it is important to take a long-term view on this issue. Consider the chart below, which shows the historical performance of various factors over different time horizons. All data is from Ken French’s data library3 for the longest history available. This data goes back to the 1920s for the market premium (Mkt-RF), small size (SMB), value (HML) and momentum (Mom). To interpret the data in the table below, each number represents the percentage of time each factor has outperformed for any given time period using monthly returns. For example, over any given one-year period since the inception of the data, the value (HML) factor has outperformed 61% of the time. The data presented shows all factors that have data available for the full duration beginning in July 1926 except for Momentum, which begins in January 1927. Growth is not an available factor in the Ken French data library, and therefore is not offered in the following table as a counterbalance to value. All data ends March 2020.

Percentage of Time of Outperformance for Various Factors as of 3/31/2020:

Market
(Mkt-RF)		 Size
(SMB)		 Value
(HML)		 Momentum
(Mom)
1 Year 70% 54% 61% 78%
3 Years 78% 54% 72% 85%
5 Years 78% 59% 80% 82%
10 Years 85% 70% 92% 79%
20 Years 100% 84% 100% 97%

Source: Ken French Data Library http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html

A few things stand out. Over the long term, all of the factors have a positive chance of outperformance no matter the horizon. And as that time horizon lengthens, the percentage of time the factor outperforms tends to improve. But even over 10 years, every factor has had periods when it lagged. In fact, value has had the best track record of success over 10 years, even surpassing that of the stock market beating riskless T-bills. So the underperformance of value today is not unexpected, nor out of line with any other factor. And while some factors have never lagged over 20 years, that doesn’t mean it couldn’t happen in the future.

What might cause value to lag growth? A common saying among investment practitioners is that when growth is scarce, growth stocks will do well. While at first glance this statement may seem paradoxical, it is really just supply and demand. However, quantifying what is meant by growth is not necessarily so easy.

The approach I use below is an analysis by William Bernstein from the early 2000s4, which was the last time value underperformed growth over a 10-year period in the wake of the late 1990s Tech bubble. I have updated the analysis with more recent data to include the latest decade of underperformance of value. In this approach, Bernstein examined the relationship between value and inflation. The relationship is noisy on a monthly basis, but becomes clearer at annual horizons and is even more impressive when examined by decade.

Chart showing Value(HML) versus Inflation

Source: Ken French data library, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
7/1926-12/2019 (most recent decade data available)

Historically, as inflation increases, value typically does better. In the world of equity investing, this is remarkably close to a straight line. The reason it is not perfectly straight is because inflation is not a perfect proxy for investors’ estimations of growth and other variables also influence value’s performance. On the first point, inflation and economic growth are certainly closely (although not perfectly) related. Greater growth in the economy ratchets up demand and increases inflationary pressures; the opposite happens with slow economic growth. What have we seen in the past ten years? Slow growth and low inflation coming out of the Great Financial Crisis, with the accompanying poor performance of value stocks.

This analysis is explanatory, rather than predictive. We know now what inflation was over the past decade. What about the next ten years? We can find reasons to be hopeful that economic growth will pick up. With the Fed having just cut interest rates and the government running annual deficits over a trillion dollars, extraordinary monetary and fiscal policy is trying to stimulate the economy. Given near zero interest rates and the recent stimulus package, strong growth could follow. But the real answer is that I don’t know what inflation will be over the next decade. And neither does anyone else. As Yogi Berra said, “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.”

The second reason inflation doesn’t perfectly align with value is that other effects also determine how value stocks perform as a whole. Such effects include investors overpaying for growth stocks such that their value counterparts lag. Research by Bridgeway5 has shown that when factors like size and value lag the most, they do eventually rebound with very strong returns. Additionally, such underperformance tends to make these factors relatively cheap, which also leads to subsequent strong long-term returns. We cannot say when such a reversal will start and, as with all of this research, the effects of market disruptions such as the current COVID-19 pandemic is not yet fully known. But history tells us that such reversals have been very strong indeed for the factors such as value that we believe in and utilize. So, perhaps what value needs is some (economic) growth? Time will tell.

1 The gap between small cap growth and small cap value is represented by the return of the Russell 2000 Growth Index minus the return of the Russell 2000 Value Index.

2 See for example, “Absence of Value”, by Scott D. Stewart et al, Financial Analysts Journal 65(6), 34 – 51 (2009).

3 https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html

4 http://www.efficientfrontier.com/ef/701/value.htm

5 Contact us for more insights into our research in the value and size factors.

DISCLAIMER
The opinions expressed here are exclusively those of Bridgeway Capital Management (“Bridgeway”). Information provided herein is educational in nature and for informational purposes only and should not be considered investment, legal, or tax advice.

The Russell 1000 Growth Index measures the performance of the large-cap growth segment of the U.S. equity universe. It includes those Russell 1000 companies with higher price-to-book ratios and higher forecasted growth values. The Russell 1000 Growth Index is constructed to provide a comprehensive and unbiased barometer for the large-cap growth segment. The Index is completely reconstituted annually to ensure new and growing equities are included and that the represented companies continue to reflect growth characteristics.

The Russell 1000 Value Index measures the performance of the large-cap value segment of the U.S. equity universe. It includes those Russell 1000 companies with lower price-to-book ratios and lower expected growth values. The Russell 1000 Value Index is constructed to provide a comprehensive and unbiased barometer for the large-cap value segment. The Index is completely reconstituted annually to ensure new and growing equities are included and that the represented companies continue to reflect value characteristics.

The Russell 2000 Growth Index measures the performance of the small-cap growth segment of the U.S. equity universe. It includes those Russell 2000 companies with higher price-to-book ratios and higher forecasted growth values. The Russell 2000 Growth Index is constructed to provide a comprehensive and unbiased barometer for the small-cap growth segment. The Index is completely reconstituted annually to ensure new and growing equities are included and that the represented companies continue to reflect growth characteristics.

The Russell 2000 Value Index measures the performance of the small-cap value segment of the U.S. equity universe. It includes those Russell 2000 companies with lower price-to-book ratios and lower expected growth values. The Russell 2000 Value Index is constructed to provide a comprehensive and unbiased barometer for the small-cap value segment. The Index is completely reconstituted annually to ensure new and growing equities are included and that the represented companies continue to reflect value characteristics.

It is not possible to invest directly in an index.

Mkt-RF or the equity risk premium is the expected excess return of the market portfolio beyond the risk-free rate. SMB or the size premium measures the additional return investors have historically received by investing in stocks of companies with relatively small market capitalization. HML or the value premium measures the additional return investors have historically received for investing in companies with high book-to-market values. Mom or the momentum premium measures the additional return investors have historically received for investing in companies with positive acceleration in stock price.

Before investing you should carefully consider the Bridgeway mutual funds’ investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses. This and other information is in the prospectus, a copy of which may be obtained by calling 1-800-661-3550 or visiting the Funds’ website at www.bridgeway.com. Please read the prospectus carefully before you invest.

Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal. In addition, market turbulence and reduced liquidity in the markets may negatively affect many issuers, which could adversely affect the mutual funds. Value stocks as a group may be out of favor at times and underperform the overall equity market for long periods while the market concentrates on other types of stocks, such as “growth” stocks.

The Bridgeway mutual funds are distributed by Foreside Fund Services, LLC, which is not affiliated with Bridgeway Capital Management, Inc. or any other affiliate.

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Andy Berkin Head of Research at Bridgeway bio image

Andrew L. Berkin, PhD

Cindy Griffin, CIPM

One of the important concepts underpinning Bridgeway’s investment philosophy is that strong factor exposure and diversification improve portfolios. When we talk about diversification, we mean not just across differing factors, but diversification also within the factor itself. Bridgeway’s more than two decades of research has shown us that factor definitions matter. But with the past decade of underperformance of the value factor, how much have different definitions mattered? Below, we look at the historical evidence for investing in the value factor and why different factor definitions have mattered less in the most recent period, one of value’s defining moments in history.

The past decade has not been kind to value investors. From 2010 through 2019, value stocks lagged growth stocks by an average of 2.61% a year.1 Such returns are in contrast to history, where value has outperformed growth 93% of the time over rolling 10-year periods going back to 1926. As of March 31, 2020, the market remained in the other 7% of the time where growth beats value. For investors who believe in value, it does not feel good. However, this underperformance is not unprecedented nor should it be a surprise. In response to this rare period, academics and ardent value investors have been taking deep dives into the factor itself and this has led many to question whether value is being measured correctly.

There are a number of different ways to measure value, and each metric has a number of variations. Each of these metrics captures a different aspect of value. As firm believers in the power of diversification to help strengthen portfolios, we believe that diversification extends to using multiple ways to measure value. We also believe the details in the definitions of these metrics can matter as well. But in the recent environment, such differences in definitions did not overcome the difficulties that value has faced, as we will see below.

A value metric typically compares two parts: a measure of what the market will pay, such as current share price, and a measure of worth, such as earnings per share. Dividing them gives the price-to-earnings or P/E ratio. By this measure, a value stock typically offers a higher amount of earnings for a lower price. Price-to-book is another value measure commonly used by both practitioners and academics that uses the book value of assets to measure worth. For both metrics, when the price goes lower, the stock becomes deeper value or cheaper. Thus, value investing often involves buying stocks that have been beaten down for some reason. That reason may vary from stock to stock, but whatever the cause, it acts as the risk element in a risk premium that ultimately could be rewarded.

However, there is another proxy for value that does not involve a measure of worth: long-term reversals. The first thing to understand about long-term reversals is the concept that stock returns tend to continue in the same direction over intermediate horizons such as one-year, giving rise to the momentum factor. With long-term reversals, looking back over longer periods, such as five years, we see that returns tend to revert. Past losers go on to outperform while past winners subsequently lag. Long-term reversals tend to be a good proxy for value because just as with measures that incorporate metrics of worth such as price-to-book, both share the feature of a beaten down stock price, which has made the stock cheap.

The chart below shows the long-term performance for price-to-book and long-term reversals for ten-year rolling periods. For each metric, we plot the excess returns of the top 30% of value stocks relative to the bottom 30%. As can be seen, the two sets of historical returns tend to resemble each other. Long-term reversals are indeed a reasonable proxy for value. The chart provides a few key take-aways to emphasize.

First, both sets of lines are typically above zero, indicating a positive excess return for that measure. Value tends to work! But sometimes the performance dips into negative territory. As noted earlier, value does sometimes lag even over ten-year horizons, and we are currently experiencing one of those times. But value has always recovered, and that recovery historically has been sudden and strong. A recent example of this occurred in the aftermath of the internet bubble, when price-to-book value’s 10-year returns went from lagging growth by 1.75% annually in early 2000 to beating it by 6.79% annually at the end of 2001.

Chart showing Value Measures Rolling Annualized 10-Year Returns

Source: Ken French Data Library

Next, the line for price-to-book is typically above that of long-term reversals. As we see, on average, including a measure of worth with a price-based measure helps to give a better value metric. This is true of other measures of worth as well, such as those based on earnings and cash flow. In keeping with Bridgeway’s strong belief in diversification, we use a combination of various measures to get exposure to the value factor.2

Finally, the right side of the plot shows that it has not been a pretty decade for value. Some have argued that the problems with value are because of how it is measured and have suggested various refinements. But in recent years, despite long-term reversals not having a worth component, the performance of value stocks as measured by price-to-book or long-term reversals looks quite similar. We see the same behavior using other worth measures besides book value.3 What this implies is that value’s recent underperformance is less about how that worth aspect is measured. Instead, it is the price aspect. What has been beaten down and become cheap has not bounced back as it historically has, but instead has continued to be beaten down further and become even cheaper.

As noted earlier, we at Bridgeway believe that how a financial metric is measured does matter, as does how it is combined and put into use. For value, these differences have mattered less of late, but using decades of data as our guide, we remain confident for the future. This underperformance of value has happened before; it is part of the “risk” aspect of risk premium that ultimately has been rewarded over time. And while value has lagged, it has become even cheaper, reaching valuation spreads that are historically large relative to the rest of the market and creating attractive opportunities as such extreme cheapness has ultimately been highly rewarded in the past. If history were to repeat itself, the underperformance of value today puts the odds in favor for stronger performance in the future. However, keep in mind with all of this research, the market volatility associated with the COVID-19 pandemic is not yet fully known.

Key Takeaways

  • The long and deep drawdown of value is not surprising; it has happened before with both value and other factors, although the current volatility is fairly uncommon.
  • Historical evidence for value gives us optimism for the coming decade.
  • Differing definitions of value have mattered less in the most recent period as a lot of what was cheap has become cheaper regardless of value measure.
  • Current valuations are creating attractive opportunities for potential future outperformance.

1 All data referenced is from the Kenneth R. French Data Library.

2 Contact us for more insights into the potential benefits of diversification of value measures.

3 Not shown for brevity.

DISCLAIMER
The opinions expressed here are exclusively those of Bridgeway Capital Management (“Bridgeway”). Information provided herein is educational in nature and for informational purposes only and should not be considered investment, legal, or tax advice.

The Russell 1000 Growth Index measures the performance of the large-cap growth segment of the U.S. equity universe. It includes those Russell 1000 companies with higher price-to-book ratios and higher forecasted growth values. The Russell 1000 Growth Index is constructed to provide a comprehensive and unbiased barometer for the large-cap growth segment. The Index is completely reconstituted annually to ensure new and growing equities are included and that the represented companies continue to reflect growth characteristics.

The Russell 1000 Value Index measures the performance of the large-cap value segment of the U.S. equity universe. It includes those Russell 1000 companies with lower price-to-book ratios and lower expected growth values. The Russell 1000 Value Index is constructed to provide a comprehensive and unbiased barometer for the large-cap value segment. The Index is completely reconstituted annually to ensure new and growing equities are included and that the represented companies continue to reflect value characteristics. It is not possible to invest directly in an index.

Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal. Diversification neither assures a profit nor guarantees against loss in a declining market.

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The fear and uncertainty around the coronavirus — and its impact on our families, fellow citizens, the economy, and the markets — can make it hard to find assurance in many things. One assurance that Bridgeway can offer is that our commitment to our clients, colleagues, and community is unwavering. Bridgeway’s primary expertise and service to clients is our approach to statistically driven, evidence-based investing, so the focus of this note is to share our perspective on the markets and investing during this time.

Let’s review some of what we know and don’t know at this point, and how Bridgeway is responding.

Some things we know

Sometimes, fear of risk helps us do the right thing. Sometimes it fails us miserably. Fear of the coronavirus can help us follow guidance from the CDC and other experts. Fear surrounding market downturns and turbulence can lead us astray.

The best equity investors think in decades, not days. Time is our friend.

However, markets incorporate new information with extreme efficiency. For some, it seems the markets overreact and then adjust. We see this occurring when markets decline significantly, as they have recently, and when they rise dramatically, as they did just a few months ago in December 2019. Even though down markets are hard to experience as human beings, investors can look at them as evidence that markets are processing information and uncertainty and performing as designed.

Disciplined investors who stay the course during market swings have been rewarded in the past. Based on historical evidence, we expect them to be rewarded again. Using Ken French’s data, looking at the worst 8 drawdowns since 1926 as presented in chart one below, the forward returns from trough were higher for larger drawdowns as expected, and the biggest bounce back has been in the first year. In fact, the bigger the drawdown, the more of the bounce back that happened in the first year. Thus, it is highly risky to try to time getting out of the market and then back in before the bounce back. Investors who hang on are typically rewarded, and those who sell miss out.

Chart showing Bounce Back Years Following Bear Markets of More Than 20%

Source: Ken French monthly data, Bridgeway
*Based on the eight 20%-plus bear markets since 1926. Click here for underlying data.

This is an especially challenging environment for value investors. Value continues to lag growth, and it has gotten worse during the recent dramatic down market. This performance gap has caused many portfolios to underperform, including Bridgeway’s, since our portfolios typically have stronger value exposure than their primary market benchmarks.

Yet this is where Bridgeway’s investment process helps a great deal, as we rely on evidence and not emotions for actions. The evidence found in historical data shows that the value premium has been remarkably pervasive and consistent. In 10-year rolling periods since 1926, the value factor outperformed 93% of the time based on Bridgeway analysis of the Ken French data library. We are currently in one of those 7% periods when value has not provided a return premium. However, history strongly suggests that these periods don’t last and that they eventually turn around.

Historical data also tells us about the magnitude of value’s previous bounce backs. The value factor as measured by the Russell 1000 value and growth universes is currently in the cheapest 10% of its history, going back 40 years to 1980. After prior periods of such extreme cheapness, the Russell 1000 Value Index outperformed the Russell 1000 Growth Index by an average of roughly five percentage points per year over the next 5 and 10 years. By carefully rebalancing portfolios to maintain value exposure, investors can be poised to ride the tailwind we expect to see when value returns to favor. We are certainly rebalancing to maintain our targeted value exposure in Bridgeway portfolios.

History does not repeat itself, but it rhymes, as Bridgeway’s Head of Research, Dr. Andrew Berkin likes to say.1 Our investment and risk professionals have been working together for more than a decade on average, and we have first-hand experience through past health and market crises such as Ebola in 2014, SARS in 2003, the post-tech bubble bear market of 2000-2003, and the recession of 2008-09. Our analysis of decades of data and academic evidence, plus our experience, tells us that investors are rewarded for taking risk and managing their behavior.

People have an amazing capacity to innovate and perform at extraordinary levels in some of the most difficult circumstances. These people drive families, companies, communities, and entire nations to outperform expectations in times like this. We believe they will again.

Some things we don’t know

Of course, we can’t predict exactly when a market turning point will come. We believe that trying to time the market or even a factor is an expensive and fruitless exercise.

We don’t know how long value will continue to underperform, but we do expect it to change.

We don’t know for sure which individuals will have the opportunity, the will, and the fortitude to rise to the occasion in this environment. In turn, we don’t know which companies will get rewarded for their innovation and extra effort in the coming weeks, months, and years. But we expect many to do so, and we expect to be among them at Bridgeway.

What we are doing

Bridgeway remains fully operational with a resilient, team-managed approach to every client portfolio. We have been working diligently to understand how the pandemic and the challenging market environment might affect our clients, colleagues, and community. More details on that work are available here.

When facing risk, we try to focus only on what we can do that would help. In the film Bridge of Spies, Tom Hanks plays an American lawyer representing a Russian spy, and he asks his client essentially the same question three different times throughout the course of the movie:

Hanks: You don’t seem alarmed.
Spy: Would it help?
Hanks: Do you never worry?
Spy: Would it help?
Hanks: So, you’re not worried?
Spy: Would it help?

The advantage of casting aside unproductive worry over things we can’t control is that we can infuse our lives with more joy and focus on more productive things—like strong relationships, rebalancing portfolios, and building a strong immune system.

We also will keep listening and learning. We’re committed to supporting the critical role that financial advisors and institutional consultants play in helping our mutual clients develop and stick with long-term plans to meet their goals—even in unprecedented times such as these.

Finally, in turbulent markets that command our attention and focus as stewards of assets, we also remain engaged with partners in our local and global community who need our support. To step up further, Bridgeway has made donations to the CDC Foundation to help with global efforts to combat the coronavirus and the Houston Food Bank to help mitigate the negative repercussions locally. We are soliciting more ideas from our team, and we welcome yours as well. As always, Bridgeway’s vision and mission keeps us focused and steadfast as we find new and creative ways of partnering to create an extraordinary future for our clients, community, and world.

1 Dr. Berkin quotes Mark Twain, but there is some controversy on this point.

DISCLAIMER
The opinions expressed here are exclusively those of Bridgeway Capital Management (“Bridgeway”). Information provided herein is educational in nature and for informational purposes only and should not be considered investment, legal, or tax advice.

The Russell 1000 Growth Index measures the performance of the large-cap growth segment of the U.S. equity universe. It includes those Russell 1000 companies with higher price-to-book ratios and higher forecasted growth values. The Russell 1000 Growth Index is constructed to provide a comprehensive and unbiased barometer for the large-cap growth segment. The Index is completely reconstituted annually to ensure new and growing equities are included and that the represented companies continue to reflect growth characteristics.

The Russell 1000 Value Index measures the performance of the large-cap value segment of the U.S. equity universe. It includes those Russell 1000 companies with lower price-to-book ratios and lower expected growth values. The Russell 1000 Value Index is constructed to provide a comprehensive and unbiased barometer for the large-cap value segment. The Index is completely reconstituted annually to ensure new and growing equities are included and that the represented companies continue to reflect value characteristics. It is not possible to invest directly in an index.

Underlying data for chart: Bounce Back Years Following the Eight 20%-plus Bear Market Declines from 1926 through 12/31/2019 of More Than 20%

Date Downdraft Next 1Y Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
06/1932 -83.71 157.49 -4.39 9.45 45.78 10.83
05/1947 -24.23 23.31 -10.95 41.28 23.43 13.77
06/1962 -23.04 30.27 19.32 6.6 6.66 14.02
06/1970 -33.59 44.45 11.22 -7.82 -15.55 19.04
09/1974 -46.42 39.55 30.85 0.23 17.36 13.85
11/1987 -29.91 23.76 29.32 -7.31 24.9 19.87
09/2002 -45.09 26.75 14.21 14.31 10.02 16.85
02/2009 -50.39 55.26 24.12 4.38 13.39 27.89
Average -42.05 50.11 14.21 7.64 15.75 17.02

Source: Ken French monthly data, Bridgeway

Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal.

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Like all of you, we have been monitoring development of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic over the last several weeks and have witnessed the tragic consequences it has had on so many lives around the world.  Our condolences to all the families who have suffered losses from this disease.

Bridgeway remains fully operational. We have been working diligently to understand how the pandemic might affect our clients, colleagues and community. Our goal in this work was to implement the necessary steps—supported by the recommendations of health policy experts and the best available data—to protect the health and well-being of all Bridgeway Partners, while ensuring we continue to serve our clients.

With that in mind, we have taken several steps to maintain our business operations:

  • We moved all Bridgeway Partners to mandatory remote-work status on Friday, March 13.
  • All traveling Partners returned home as of Friday, March 13, and we have halted all business travel through April 15.
  • Bridgeway has had a Pandemic Incident Plan in place since 2009, which includes business continuity practices related to remote working, offsite data backup and recovery, and other critical functions. We’ve supplemented this plan by engaging a business continuity expert who will modify our procedures as needed while the COVID-19 situation continues to evolve.
  • We have also deployed an incident response team to work through the exceptional circumstances of this pandemic. The team will be evaluating the situation on an ongoing basis, while also monitoring recommendations issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and state/local authorities, to make any necessary adjustments.

Over the years, we have invested significantly in our remote working capabilities and procedures to prepare for events like this. We’ve also communicated with our external partners to ensure that our firm can continue to function without disruption.

We will continue to monitor this evolving situation and pay close attention to the guidance of health policy experts. Everyone at Bridgeway is committed to caring for one another and working together to get our company—and our clients and community —through this challenging period.

For the latest information on COVID-19, and to learn more about how you can support your families and communities during this time, please consult the CDC’s website.

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